

Cargo Security in Dar Es Salaam Ports: Challenge for the Implementation WCU Framework of Standards and Commercial Cargo Security

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Abstract

Cargo security in ports is undoubtedly vital due to the immense value of materials handled and risk involved. It involves both securing global trade and particular port commercial security. As such, it's no wonder governments, International Organizations, Ports and all cargo logistics service providers and port stakeholders dealing with cargo movements, have engaged in securing cargo for global trade facilitation. The exercise does not only focus on short-term cost –benefit considerations rather an overall global movement of cargo through all modes of transport. The paper reviews various World Customs Organization (WCO) frameworks of standard securing global trade and evaluates the extent Dar es Salaam port reached on the implementation of those standards. Further the paper review commercial cargo security in the port of Dar es Salaam. It proved Tanzanian expert views, obtained through experience/executive-survey due to unavailability of data by various organizations that were approached for the purpose. These observations engender imminence of detailed studies for better insights on the subject matter, limiting the results to scruples.

The study leading to this paper lasted for six-month interview from long experience expert, in operating with the port of Dar es Salaam. It covers port terminals, and ICDs in Dare s Salaam port. The study reveals crucial hitches in cargo security systems in the terminals and the resulting economic demerits. The observation suggests needs to rectify cargo security practices and systems in the port of Dar es Salaam to attract more benefits to sponsors stakeholders and the economy at large. There a need to restructure service provision model in the port so as to limit the great number of people entered port area. Currently, all players are allowed to enter port area which is contra to SAFE standards. It is high time for the port of Dar es Salaam to adopt international acceptable operation standards which limit access of port to only Authorized Economic Operators (AEO). Further, it had noted Tanzania community does not ripe most of the trade facilitation under SAFE standards as still cargo clearance and dwell time is very high with all the cargo subjected to double verification i.e. through the scanner and physical verification.

Key Words: Cargo security, SAFE framework of standards, authorized economic operators, customs to customs, and customs to business

1. INTRODUCTIONS

Cargo shipments are vulnerable to terrorist threat, theft, loss, and damage no matter how the goods are being transported, and ports, trucks and warehouses are all in risk. With the September 11 terrorist attack in the USA and the great wave of a terrorist threat in the world the importance of securing global trade is vivid. Further billions of dollars worth of cargo lost each year and cargo theft reaching an all-time record high (Honke and Frenandez, 2018).It's more important than ever to reduce the risks and improve security measures to keep good safe especially if you're looking to go for AEO accreditation (WCO, 2015). Strengthening supply chain vulnerabilities is critical not only because of the thief, but to prevent criminals from compromising containers with illegal and illicit materials (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). Even as important as having good cargo security practices, is the constant need to evaluate for areas to improve as many supply chains are always vulnerabilities to terrorist and cargo safety threat (WCO,2012). A multi – stakeholders approach such as the SAFE framework of standards pillars is the best in securing global trade. The framework requires all players in cargo supply chain to be certified as Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) after extensive training, proper documentation and finely tuned practices taking advantage of technology.

The reoccurrence episodes in Dar es Salaam port which containers have been cleared without due payment of fees or cargo stolen from within the port premises or from Inland Container Depots (ICDs). In 2016, it was noted that over 3000 containers were missing from the port (Honke and Frenandez, 2018). An audit carried by Ports Authority in 2016 revealed that 11,884 containers and 2019 vehicles had being cleared from ICDs without payment of wharfage. Despite ICDs being in vicinities of the port, security of containers to and from the port is

questionable. Security in the port controversy is mainly revolved around what the system in place for cargo security in that port.

Cargo theft and damage also continues to be growing issue all across the world with numbers reaching an all time high (Honke and Frenandez, 2018). Many reason for the increase in cargo value, more sophisticated thieves and terrorism complicate the issue. Supply- chain security refers to efforts to enhance the security of the supply chain for the world's cargo movement. It combines traditional practices of supply – chain management with the security requirement driven by a threat such as terrorism, piracy, and theft. International organization supply chain screening and validating of the standard include, credentialing of participants in the supply chain, screening and validating of content of cargo being shipped, advance notification of the contents to the destination country, ensuring the security of the cargo while in transit via the use advanced technology and proper chain security management not in place in most of ports.

There is little evidence of documented literature or researches on cargo security and related problems in Tanzania. Those studies such as Honke and Frenandez, (2018), prove that terminal and ICDs operators invest reasonably for the security of good they store often by employing security staff, alarm system, facing and gate constructions. Thus the question isn't whether there exist effort on the security of the cargo in Tanzania port, but rather whether efforts conform to SAFE framework of standards requirements and are appropriate, effective and economical.

The paper is divided into four parts. Part 1 cover abstract, introduction. Problem analysis and study objective, part 2 give literature review of cargo security, part 4 discuss Tanzania standing point on the implementation of SAFE framework of standards and commercial security, and last conclusion and list of selected references given in part 4.

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

Cargo security through securing global supply chain and commercial security of goods in ports has been a problem throughout the world (Cowen, 2014). The significance of security of good to global trade and profitability of ports or ICDs is undoubted. Common security risks that ports face include terrorist threat, theft, burglary, pilferage, and damages /spoilage to goods that occur in the cause of theft and burglary. Supply chain security refers to an effort to enhance the security of the supply chain, the transport and logistics system for the world cargo. It combined traditional practices of supply chain management with security requirements driven by threats such as terrorism, piracy and theft.

The SAFE framework of standards among other things includes three pillars to foster closer cooperation between customs and other cargo movement players in ensuring an efficient and effective response to the challenges of supply chain security. The framework appreciates all of its partners in government and the private sector that are working in close collaboration to maintain the relevance of the SAFE Framework in a changing trade environment. The main task is anchored on Customs authority to make sure all three pillars implemented in the country. The problems are how fast the country had implemented those standards with the revenue collection maximizations undermines the efforts.

Further, research effort about the magnitudes of losses security problem even in developed countries are not far dated. For instance, in the USA it started in the 1970's as a vital step to arrest cargo security risk (OTS, 2015) Theft losses alone in the USA supply chain are estimated to range between USD 4b to 12b per year while total global losses could exceed USD 50B (O, Connell 2015). According to Adams (2005), an average company probably loses around 12 percent of its asset year somewhere in the supply chain in the USA.

Comparable revelations' on Tanzania are lacking, as no existing studies the subject matter in the country, hence the real value of cargo security of goods is hard to recognize. Investigation reveals that Dar es Salaam port and ICDs do not organize data and information about their security problems and/or they do not effectively utilize it in their security plans.

According to Argon, (2005), the best out of cargo security calls for cost–benefit consideration to all stakeholders, which entail comparison between security effort and its impact. This position requires careful thought as Delapaz,(2005) noted difficulty to measure returns' of security efforts though companies must assess their security need and determine what they aim at and can afford to invest in keeping their supply chains safe.

The theoretical perspectives in this paper are aimed highlighting basic benchmarks of the SAFE framework of standards and commercial security of cargo in supply chain system necessary to maximize on cargo security operations so that at the end of the day, a post account from security systems is vivid.

The objective of this Study: is, therefore, to explore the level Tanzania achieved in implementation SAFE framework of standards and eventually spur and commodity security studies in ports in Tanzania perspectives Thus, any feedback to this paper is much welcome.

2. REVIEW OF CARGO SECURITY LITERATURE

2.1 UNDERSTANDING THE ESSENCE OF CARGO SECURITY SYSTEM IN PORT

What Does Cargo Security Means?

Cargo security concerns protection of goods from risk or danger of purposeful man-made incidences that cause loss or damage to cargo. It differs from cargo safety in that it excludes protection against accidents and acts of God. Purposeful incidences include those aimed at direct economic gains like terrorist, theft, burglary, fraud, trafficking of contrabands and those fostering aimed other goals or indirect financial benefits like economic sabotage and terror actions. All prevalence perpetuating cargo insecurity cause economic hazard in ports and ICDs and should be prevented.

Sanders (1994) ideally defined cargo security as the ability achieve very low rates of and damage and thus maintains goods in perfect condition I.e. in practice we should be aim at minimum loss/ damage out of security efforts deployed rather than anticipating total elimination.

Of the same, a question arises as to what should be the acceptable rates of damage/loss due to insecurity prevalence. One may wonder whether there could be a commonly acceptable level of insecurity in the port considering differences terminals' location and communities that surround them.

The scope of this study includes security against terrorism and the likes. The challenges of preventing terror actions in recent years has become far beyond the competence of individual ports but has been put under international port security protocols such as SAFE framework of standards for securing international cargo movement. Ordinary security measurement at the level of each port May end- up unveiling terror missions and are considered as part of cargo secured in international cargo movement.

2.1.1 Impact of Cargo Security Risk to the Logistics Sector

A study conducted by the US Department of Transportation in 1999 found a number of devastating effects of cargo theft in the transportation network, the major ones being;

1: Vulnerability to terrorist attack.

2: Disruption of reliable and effacing of good from shippers to receivers: Stolen goods will not reach the intended receiver and thus disrupt his economic operations. This disruption is not relieved even by indemnification by endurance companies since indemnifications always come for several days, if not months, after the planned usage time of goods.

3: Expensive theft-related losses, which include the direct cost of the stolen cargo. This is all about the actual value of good involved in thefts. More often than not, shippers and/or receivers tend to technicalities of trade and reinsurance policies.

5. Additional administrative expense: The US Office of Transportation Security (OTS) (1999), estimated indirect costs, such as filing, investigating, and law enforcement and paying claims, to be two to five times the value of stolen goods.

6: Reduce transportation industry profits. The above costs will apparently impinge on the profits of two to five times the value of stolen goods.

7: Increased prices for consumers: It is usual for the business organization to shift all or lest part of such costs to consumers in the form of increased prices. This way, consumers are made to participate in marking good the losses incurred through cargo insecurity. Firms find it easy to pass on such costs if security incidences are rampant in a given area. i.e if the risks are not a unique case to particular or just a few firms.

2.1.2 Objectives and benefits of cargo Security Systems in Ports

Cargo security in supply Chain may be broken into three periods of time- prior to shipment, during shipment and after shipment. The majority of security risks occur either prior to or after shipment i.e. during storage. Thus, commercial security activities become more vivid in ports and ICDs.

Objective and benefits of commercial security of good in port derive from the meaning of cargo security and are discussed in a few paragraphs below.

i. To safeguard cargo from a risk of terrorist, damage, loss, theft, burglary, sabotage, and the likes activities done to attain this objective depend on the security risk level magnitude of loss in case of security peril, natural and value of cargo at risk, and an environment in which the ICDs is located. Based on this factor, security activities may not include intelligence operations.

ii. To capture information about parties and partners who have security importance to cargo. These enable proper treatment of the parties and consultations for cargo security. Parties with poor security record or even completely strange parties will be treated differently from ordinary parties. Rating of parties may be done periodically or for each transaction depending on the security situation, status of parties and /or cargo sources and destinations. Also, parties who have interests in securing cargo, like Customs department at customs controlled areas may assist in some way to check cargo security perils for the sake of safeguarding tax collections.

- iii. To keep a record on security problems for use in security analysis and planning. Proper planning needs sufficient and correct information, which require deliberate efforts to gather. Also, information on cargo security incidences may avail learning risky activities, tactics risk sources, etc and helps advance plans to arrest the situation.

Although the above objectives have been given in general terms, ports need to determine specific and detailed objectives of their security measures in those lines and beyond.

Inventiveness in security responsibilities has become imperative in recent years ensuing from criminal's mind-boggling and creativity thus security officials' effectiveness rely on their ability to keep abreast with these changes. Hence, fundamentals of cargo security system discussed below only serve the framework and not a total solution to security problems of cargo security problems of cargo in warehouses. Open – minded approach to specific situations of ports for effective systems is vital continuous assessment and improvement to security systems is a necessity.

2.2 Global Trade Security Initiatives

Global trade securing initiatives goes far back early 1940s with both inter governments, multi governments, and international organizations agreement. The list cannot comprehensively be narrated in the paper but as the SAFE framework of standard set, a major milestone on those initiatives below is the list in nutshell on before SAFE framework standard and SAFE framework it is self.

2.2.1 International Initiative before WCO Frame work of standards

Supply chain security initiative global trade before SAFE including : Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorist (C-TPAT), a voluntary compliance program for companies to improve the security of their corporate supply chains, Container Security Initiative (CSI) global container Programmer(CCP) Global Trade Exchange, International ship and port security Code (ISPS code), RFID and GPS, .ISO/PAS 28000 Specification for security Management systems for the supply Chain, SO/IEC20243.

2.2.2 SAFE Framework of standards

WCO in June 2005 adopted the SAFE framework of standards to secure and facilitate a global trade which has detailed structure for securing global trade than all prevails one. SAFE Framework act as a deterrent to international terrorism, secure revenue collections and promote trade facilitation worldwide. It has additions sections on 2007 which provide conditions and requirements for Customs and AEOs. The SAFE framework of standard 2015 edition encompasses a new version that includes a new pillar on cooperation between Customs and other Government and Inter-Government agencies.

According to WCO, 2015:2, objectives of the SAFE framework now are: “

- i. Establish standards that provide supply chain security and facilitation at a global level to promote certainty and predictability.
- ii. Enable integrated and harmonized supply chain management for all modes of transport.
- iii. Enhance the role, functions and capabilities of Customs to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century.
- iv. Strengthen co-operation between Customs administrations to improve their capability to detect high-risk consignments.
- v. Strengthen co-operation between Customs administrations and other Government agencies involved in international trade and security
- vi. Strengthen Customs/Business co-operation.
- vii. Promote the seamless movement of goods through secure international trade supply chains.

The SAFE framework consists of four core elements. First, it harmonizes the advance electronic cargo information requirements on inbound, outbound and transit shipments. Second, each country that joins the SAFE Framework commits to employing a consistent risk management approach to address security threats. Third, it requires that at the reasonable request of the receiving nation, based upon a comparable risk targeting methodology, the sending nation's Customs administration will perform an outbound inspection of high-risk cargo and/or transport conveyances, preferably using non-intrusive detection equipment such as large-scale X-ray machines and radiation detectors. Fourth, the SAFE Framework suggests benefits that Customs will provide to businesses that meet minimal supply chain security standard”

It is clear that member countries need to engage in deliberate effort to undertake all three pillars as stipulated by its standards in order to secure global trade as above SAFE objectives stipulate. The implementation of those standards requires full commitment of both customs authority, business community and government authorities in terms of planning, financing and coordination's in agency matter to meet tie framework for executing the framework SAFE established those standards in the spirit that there is agency need to damage the entire global economy and social well being of nations it create strategy to secure the cargo movement in global trade. Its objectives are to establish standards to secure supply chain; enhance customs role function

and capabilities to meet securing global trade challenges; strengthen co-operations between custom administrations, customs and other government agency involve in international trade and customs business community; and promote seamless secured movement of goods. Those frameworks have various standards set in order to make sure it pillars fully participate in making sure the global trade chains secured.

2.3 FUNDAMENTALS OF AN EFFECTIVE CARGO SECURITY SYSTEM

Several measures contribute to preventing cargo in ports from theft and other security risks in the supply chain. The importance of involving all players across the global supply chain is a vital tool in securing global trade. Administrative and procedural guidance's for each port area should abide with the SAFE framework of standards guidelines as well as up to date technology for securing goods movement. Some security procedures apply to commodities focus of this study is on securing global trade while others are relevant under only commercial security. Value of cargo in, as well as locations of the port will always influence decisions regarding measures and extent of security efforts taken.

2.3.1 Commonly Overlooked Security Considerations

Cargo security systems of some ports are ineffective as it fails to involve all players as SAFE framework suggest. Below we provide the commonly overlooked security considerations.

1: Failure to secure all chain using three pillars, Customs to customs network arrangement, Customs to business partnerships and Customs to other Government Agencies co-operations.

2: Know and connect trade chain (e.g. Freight Forwarders, ship agents tally companies, etc): Knowing the honest status of trade intermediaries give an indication of the extent of care needed when dealing with each. This does not call for a relaxation of security measure when dealing with poorly rated.

Parties' penalty tariff may be instituted to discourage dishonesty manners and encouraged honesty practices. This consideration should not be construed of stakeholders, but rather it emphasizes the need to recognize the value of honesty practice by the organizations and individual with whom we interact in cargo logistics and storage functions.

3: Secure sensitive cargo chain information: Only practice with a legitimate interest to particular cargo should have access to information about it. Information about types of goods, cargo value and others shipping information can prompt and/ or aid thieves.

In the early 2000s, there was established a fault in publishing shipping information by US customs department without categorization; some information is found to impinge on the competitive position of importers and exporters while others helped criminals to steal cargo from port and terminals, thus secure, but also information pertaining to the goods. A client should also educate of the importance to the secure information of their good in that regard.

4: Pre-receipt security measures: History has shown that many good are vulnerable because security effort is observed only from the point of receipt into ports. However, all per-shipment warehousing, packing, counting, marking and transportation activities must be checked for security information concerns. This is best done through proper documentations connotations as well as recording at changeovers. This is best done through proper documentation a well as recording at changeover stages in the supply chain.

5: Ascertain security status of cargo source and chain: Some place is known of high security actions and practices of the trade. Consideration of this aspect can help check security risks posed to the organization by instituting stringent measures for goods originating from such localities this consideration critical even when dealing with honest and reputable intermediaries.

Although more relevant to the security of goods during transportations, a recent quotation of the direction of International Maritime Bureau (IMB) potting Mukundan, clear verify this consideration. Expressing about risks posed by trade transactions originating from Iran in May 2005 he had this to say:

Many of these secondary transactions appear to be fake, as traded 'good and the vessels said to be shipping them, simply do not exist. In others cases, the cargoes stated on the bills of lading never actually loaded... An IMB investigation indicates that roughly two thirds of such transactions on the secondary forfeiting market were fraudulent".

6: All time consideration of documentation/security requirement for granting ownership to cargo. An empirical case involved a cargo release by the destination port authority without presentation of lading by consignee simply because the cargo was consigned to a government ministry. Such mishandling of documentation procedures can give rooms to serious security risk.

Effective cargo security systems are founded on administrative, physical and technological measures. The former should include operational procedures while the later involve tangible structures. Below is an emphasis of the position of these measures to cargo security in ports.

2.3.2 Administrative Measures of Cargo Security in terminals and ICDs

To establish an effective cargo security system, Delapaz (2005) recommends starting with the risk assessment to determine the vulnerability of each cargo holding facility. This entails considering things like the type of

commodities stored and transported, modes of transportation used, parties who have access to the facilities and cargo destination. Imaginative thinking depending on the local situation is vital e.g. consideration whether or there exists black market for certain products kept in your stockyard, likelihood of given a party or facility to succumb to insecurity actions, etc

Furthermore, it necessary to have documented and publicized security regulations so as arouse awareness and keenness to every person involved in security related duties. Documented and publicized regulations elicit a positive response from pertinent publics more easily than if pushed from a few persons' minds. This emphasizes the importance of people, process, and knowledge, on top of physical structures and technology. Assessment of national and international regulations and procedures and competence of security staff (both within and outside the organization) is thus, of paramount importance.

Administrative measures for cargo security in ports should be in pace but must be in harmony with the SAFE framework of standards.

An effective security system should value organization's need to satisfy customers meet the cost of cargo security through the price and this they pay and gives them the right to be considered. Security check procedures for identifying people seeking entry to premises, administering government security regulations, etc tend to cause delays and inconveniences to customers in the process of serving them. Though inevitable, formalities need to be marketing oriented in their implementation so that customers do not feel mistreated. An easy way to achieve this is to assign a senior official responsible for checking balances between security needs and customer satisfaction. Well- handled higher security measures can become a satisfier to clients. One useful way is to educate relevant publics about the essence of various security procedures and actions, to let them know that they benefit from resulting security. Those security measures should be inclusive all supply chain players and focus should be on securing the whole chain.

2.3.3 Concept of Commercial cargo security

There are many practices that can be implemented to increase the security of a cargo load whilst in travel. Available methods for protecting cargo are: Inventory counts done daily to quickly draw attention to any shortages or missing product , use of security guards, GPS systems with alarms when the load goes off route, kill switches that prevent vehicles with stolen loads from moving, special tape to indicate when parcels have been tampered with stolen good databale to help identify criminals offloading stolen goods, and third party investigation teams that work toward recovery. Each port needs to develop their own practices for the security of the cargo while in port or moving to and from ports. These strategies need to encompass building strong relationships with all partners to minimize the chances of inside job .limiting employee turnover, properly training staff including proper certification and careful inside communications with every party involved in the shipping, transportation and receiving of the materials.

Security measures need to consistently reviewed and adjusted to reflect what is happening in the industry at the time, ever involving to stay ahead of sophisticated criminals. Companies need to develop a strong partnership with every one involving of their goods including logistics providers, drivers, border patrol and those on the receiving end to make sure the product arrives safely and valuable loads are properly protected while in transit. Security is the concern for manufacturers and logistics provider across the globe and those looking at AEO accreditation, a secure supply chain is a must Port keeps goods waiting for export transshipped and imported to and from the ports. The time goods stay in the port depends on clearance time in those ports. At one time the goods in the ports had the value of millions of dollars and due to the nature of the port's operations the risk of damage or theft it is' very high. It is vital to look on how best the goods stored by invest for safety and security. Often, security efforts in port's are arranged to extend to all properties beyond commercial goods that undermine the degree of focus to the commercial security of goods. This paper limits its scope to the security of commercial goods, exploring its effectiveness and efficiencies

3.0 SOME INSIGHT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEFRAMEWORK OF STANDARDS AND CARGO SECURITY OPERATIONS IN TANZANIA PORTS

To obtain empirical insights of ports in Tanzania regarding the implementation of the SAFE framework and commercial security, observations and opinions of thirty cargo security expert in Dar es Salaam were gathered and assessed. The experience expert executive with a minimum of fifteen years in the field was drawn from forwarding firms, ship Agents, Cargo Tallying companies and terminal and ICDs operations professional as well as trainers in transports and logistics within Dar es Salaam.

Structure questions posed to the thirty experts sought to elicit their views on the following:

- i. Whether there is sufficient awareness, on SAFE framework of standards and on their parts or others, documented rules/ regulations on securing global trade and commercial cargo security at a national level and Dar port level.
- ii. Whether Dar es Salaam port employ the full SAFE framework of standards as stipulated in the 2015 version

- iii. What extent customs authority fulfill Customs to Business pillar standards as stipulated by a SAFE framework of standards 2015
- iv. What extent Customs authority implement Customs to Other Government Authorities pillar standards
- v. Whether the Dar port keeps records of security problem and incidences and uses records to derive information for cargo security planning
- vi. Whether they are aware of any usage of security records and information by TPA, other than planning for security systems
- vii. The Existence of cost- benefit assessment of security budgets by TPA.
- viii. Commonly experienced security problems, their causes and trend in the port of Dar- es Salaam
- ix. The envisage gravity of cargo security problems, identifiable in the port of Dar es Salaam.
- x. The impact of cargo security problem in Dar port to various publics and vivid measure to check the problems

The following few paragraphs provide findings of the inquiry from the executive survey and observations that were conducted over a period of thirteen months.

3.1 STATUS OF CARGO SECURITY SYSTEM S IN TANZANIA PORTS

The study noted that 70 percent of the respondents are not having detail information on the SAFE framework of standards and on their parts or others, of documented rules/ regulations on securing global trade. Thus as the framework gives the task to customs Authority to oversee implementation, there is a need to increase awareness strategy to both players involves on those three pillars in the country. Much may be done by customs but it's paramount to make sure all supply chain players are well informed and operate at the same pace. The levels of implementation of SAFE framework differ from one pillar to another. For the Customs to customs networking much information shared between customs authority and other authority in EAC, SADC and internationally. Thus indicates there well networking between customs authorities but yet the movement of goods within our borders is not seamless. The focus of networks should promote the seamless movement of goods through our borders. Further, the level of trust between Customs authority in the region need to be improved so as to reduce delays of cargo in those borders. There is a need to simplify clearance processes between our countries borders through examine current cargo clearance procedures and remove duplication.

The issue of whether Dar es Salaam port employs the full SAFE framework of standards as stipulated in the current 2015 version addressed, the study noted that only some of those guidelines implemented in Tanzania. Each supply chain member should be included on the implementation program. There were high involvement from 2005 to 2015 were trade facilitation such as green channel clearance, client risk profiling and compliant scheme in place. Customs authority from 2016 to date, it has over emphases on revenue collection, where all of those initiatives removed.

Another question was to what extent customs authority fulfills Customs to Business pillar standards as stipulated by the SAFE framework of standards 2015. The study reveals that most of those guidelines under this pillar are not implemented. The main focus of the pillar is to facilitate cargo clearance by using up to date technologies. In Tanzania customs still undertake double inspection of imports, exports, and transit. Despite all containers scanned while transferred to ICDs yet they are subjected to physical inspection before released.

On aspect of extent Customs authority implement Customs to Other Government Authorities pillar standards, the study reveals that despite some efforts in place but till now no harmonized clearance procedures for all government agencies neither any single window upon which all agencies should use during the clearance process. Each agency act on its own hence causes a lot of delay in cargo clearance contrary with the spirit of seamless movement of cargo as SAFE framework proposed. Customs and other government agencies should ensure an efficient and effective government response to the challenges of supply chain security. The existence of cooperation of government agencies in Tanzania are not very smooth as each one of them delivers its mandated function without having the common interest on securing global trade. Various procedures are not harmonized and no single window for all agencies to offer their services through it. The establishment of stop center was one step towards the accomplishment of integrations of government agencies service butt it had stopped on having one office with previous procedures and system upon which previous procedures. The respondents proposed the need to streamline those agencies procedure and system upon which they can talk to each other on an interest of facilitating trade and securing global trade. The culture of each agency showing its superiority on through stopping of cargo release should be worked out. The model operand of those agencies causes a high number of movements of people inside the port which is a potential risk to secure global trade as well as commercial security. The SAFE framework encourages establishing cooperative arrangement between customs and other government agencies which are the idea behind the concept of one stop border post, the concept should be implemented also in port of Dar es Salaam.

To unveil the main SAFE securing global trade and securing perils in Tanzania ports, questions were asked to the experts about challenges on implementing the SAFE framework of standards in Tanzania and security problems commonly in encountered in the ports of Dar es Salaam, and their enormity. Responses to those

questions revealed that the country is not well prepared to implement the SAFE framework of standard as the second and third pillars have not been the focus of the players and implementation faces the great challenge of maximizing revenue collection in the country. Also the study found the dominance of perils that target customer goods more than TPA's own goods

The focus of SAFE framework of a standard is for common users of port of Dar- es Salaam consider cargo security operations in the ports to be haphazardly done, in the absence of documented rules and regulations for facilitating cargo security in the ports. About 70 percent of them confirmed the contention at 92% response rate. This deficiency was noted to reply at the organization as well as state level. Further investigation on the remaining 30 percent, revealed that their non0 confirmation was mistaken by regulation and rule to cargo safety as opposed to cargo security.

Most experts' feels that the ports implement cargo security measures based on personalized ideas of ports officials as they change from time to time. When the ideas instructed, verbally or through memos and circulars, are executed for some time they become security regulations to that extent. Nevertheless, alterations to the parties external to the ports authority they fail to cope with those instructions. This tendency is typical in the case of verbal instructions, which tend to be implemented shortly and discard soon afterward.

The interpretation of the above is that TPA does not have documented cargo security regulations or where available, they are scattered in loose circulars and memos.

Almost all believe the ports of Dar es Salaam takes and keeps records of cargo security matters and incidences despite their withholding of the same to other users, like researchers. However, analysis of the finding below casts doubt on the presumption because of the authority's failure to reflect value for money in their security plans.

Over 80% of the executives were of the views that authority does not use security records and information in their cargo security plans. The executive conceived the main reasons for the setbacks of being poor skills and lack of professionalism on the part of security staff; lack of technological installations (e. g. computers, alarms systems) to facilitate the capture, processing and dissemination of information; and stereotyped view of top management regarding the function of cargo security that doesn't recognize its strategic position.

Consistent to this observation, about 90% of the experts precluded the existence of cost-benefit analysis in TPA's cargo security plans as they pointed to the tendency of assigning security responsibilities to people with customers need's empathy; people who view a customer as a deprived party.

Notably and interestingly, all the experts including those who denoted existence of cost-benefit analysis in cargo security system plans in TPA spelled out the following views:

- Poor of bad utilization of funds with less value being saved than expended
- Security functions in Tanzania ports are entrusted to incompetent personnel
- The problem of cargo insecurity is "big" (I .e. 9-10% of total cargo handled in Tanzania ports are subjected to security perils of some sort)or" appalling" (i.e. Over 10% of cargo going through Tanzania ports are subjected to security perils some sort)
- Theft and damage to ports' own goods in less than 4% with over 96%of security perils befalling customers' goods. In the opinion of all the experts, responsibilities of personnel entrusted for the commercial security of cargo in ports in Tanzania are limited to operational and non-strategic duties. They identified four main duties of cargo security officials in ports as summarized below:

- Controlling and checking entry and exists of cargo and people in ports
Controlling and checking movements of people, especially outsiders, within ports

- Arranging for cargo insurance of cargo handle or stored in their ports
- Process or participate in the process of cargo claims that emanate from security perils


The above does not reflect a single strategic role security. Hence, strategic essence of cargo security in Tanzania ports is impeded by functional design- through inappropriate manning of relevant departments and restricting responsibilities to operational and routine tasks.

3.2. Practical Cargo Security Challenges in Tanzania Ports

Knowing practical cargo security challenges is vital in determining an appropriate security system to employ. Challenges differ between places depending on social- economic situations, locality, cultural and even political situations. Also, the gravity of particular security perils tend to differ among regions, countries or ports

3.2.1.The Conflicting focus for revenue collection and facilitation

The SAFE frame focus on facilitates and international trade by making easier for buyers and sellers to move goods across borders. The benefit expected are faster processing goods by customs and in turn reduce cargo clearance time and cost. The statistics show that despite some improvement in cargo clearance in Dar es Salaam port the container dwell time very high. In the result the port has considered having higher logistics cost due to storage, demurrage, customs warehouse rent and removal charges.



Source: Calculation from SUMATRA statistics 2018

In the opinion of all the experts, the overemphasis on revenue collection in which all of the cargos are subject to physical verification could be one of the causes of high dwells time in Dar es Salaam

3.2.2 Level of professionalism of Freight forwarders as Authorized Economic Operators

The country level of freight forwarders professionalism as the SAFEsecond pillar of Customs to Business requires in order abiding with secure of global trade requirement steal is questionable. Most of the operator on experience bases without proper training and skills improvement program, There code of ethics TAFFA approved which is a positive step to towards professionalism yet the document is in the paper only without any machinery for its enforcement. Also, TAFFA with other players in the industry started processed of establishing professional board for freight forwarders practitioners but the establishment of that board had taken over ten years without even come with the law itself. It’s high time for the industry to expedite the process of professionalized freight forwarding service in Tanzania by improve training, certification and establishing proper recognized professional boards for its self controlling. The move could expedite the process of licensing Authorized Economic operator as the SAFE framework of standards requires.

The focus of the third pillar of the SAFE framework of standards is to foster closer cooperation between

3.2.3 Common Cargo Security in TPA

All experts noted less than 4% of perils befalling TPA’s own goods. The specific problems identified by the experts in descending order of their gravity are:

- i. Pilferage of customer goods from packages in ports
- ii. Theft of customer’s goods from ports
- iii. Damage/spoilage to customer’s goods in the course of theft or pilferage or pilferage
- iv. Theft of own goods from packages in ports
- v. Pilferage of own good from packages in ports
- vi. Damage/ spoilage to own goods in the course of theft or pilferage

3.2.4 Level of Staff Competence

Incompetence of security officials was the single reason for security problems that were identified by all experts. Other reasons were lack of appropriate plans and efforts to tackle security problems at firms as well as national levels. Incompetence of security personal anticipates absence of adherence to fundamental principles of cargo security in ports. Disregard of the function by top management was yet another reason observed by 60 percent of the experts.

Investigation about the application of cargo security, an inquiry was made on measures used by TPA in their security system. Measure to check security problems in ports in accordance with theory were listed and the experts requested to identify the ones they think are being used or have experience with in cargo security activities in TPA. The experts picked only three measures out of the even that was enumerated earlier on as follows:

- i. Control of access to premises
- ii. Inspection of stores by supervisors
- iii. Secure structures of buildings and ports

The person outside particular ports may hardly note certain security control even when undertaken, but several measures are noticeable if they really exist. This suggests that some measures not identified by the experts may actually be in use while others are really secluded. Issues like electronic surveillance, marketing orientation, marking of store documented security regulations are but some examples to confirm weak adoption of cargo security in ports.

Investigation as to why certain measures aren't adopted highlight better the understanding of cargo shortfalls and challenges in Tanzania. Nonetheless, the irresponsibility of ports and/or relevant staff incompetence explains some of these performance deficiencies. The following anecdotes one the expert may be emphasizing this contention:

".... Quit often, the port authority has delivered cargo to this client without our release... though it's a government department... Luckily ocean freight was prepaid all the time...."

The implication we get from cargo security efforts in Tanzania ports is that thing is done with little keen and disregard to principles.

3.2.5 Cargo Security Regulations and Rules in Tanzania

Furthermore, no strategic thinking is attached to security efforts. One of the experts noted the following with respect to this:

Records on cargo security incidence appear to be geared for tackling isolated tasks like pursuing cases at courts of law and insurance claims but not for combating cargo insecurity..." Six other experts supported the nation when separately requested to comment on it. The other five had a reservation, on grounds that it's the owners of data who can say with certainty what uses do the data have. However, they admitted being unaware of strategic uses of security data and information at least in so far as the ports of Dar es Salaam are concerned. From this observation, it may be safely said that the underlying major causes of security problems in Tanzania ports is the failure to recognize the danger posed by inappropriate cargo security efforts to ports, customers ,organization's marketing positions and the overall economy.

Commercial impacts of such a situation are discussed in the few paragraphs below.

3.3 COMMERCIAL IMPACT OF THE STATUS OF CARGO SECURITY SYSTEMS IN TANZANIA PORTS

An investigation made to ascertain commercial impacts of cargo security systems in Tanzania under its contemporary situation unveiled the following:

i. Undermined Customer Trust and confidence:

The current status of commercial security of cargo in ports undermines customer trust and expectations as to their suitability. Nine experts were of the opinion that the level of cargo security in TPA is minimal especially due to improper staffing, lack of firm's regulation and rules and inappropriate or insufficient security measure:

When asked whether they think the market applauds cargo security measures at the port of Dar es Salaam as acceptable for cargo security and good services to clients, all experts disapproved the ideas. Some regarded the measures as misdirected, inconveniencing and complaints builder while others were of the opinion that the measures as misdirected, inconveniencing and complaints builder while others were of the opinion that the measure is well directed but fail to value communication with a client about security issues

ii. Restraining Effectiveness and Encouraging Graft:

None existence of documented rules and regulations and /or failure to publicize the same clients who are supposed to adhere to them has engendered ineffectiveness of the system, as it limits willingness on the part of clients.

Undue powers by security officials and graft loopholes are introduced in the system as officials can take personalize actions to serve own purposes rather than organizations with no possibility of pertinent publics noting anomalies. Consequently, some security officials have become arrogant and suppress bona fide.

Customers causing ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and inconveniences to entice bribe, while letting bogus clients succeeding their mission leading to the vivid current poor cargo security status in the ports.

iii. Poor Utilization of resources:

Astonishingly, all experts were of the views that security system at the port manifest poor utilization of sponsor's funds. This should not be expected from those who thought, the measures are well directed and the perception that the rate of cargo security risk is unreasonably high as well as the arrogance of some security guards. Again, astonishingly, when the experts were asked whether they consider the benefits of TPA security system to exceed the costs, all couldn't affirmatively estimate the situation.

3.4 STRATEGIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CARGO SECURITY STATUS

Foregoing part of this paper shown loss of firms' and, that matter, national resources due to inappropriate cargo security systems in Tanzania ports. Thefts and damages to goods, undelivered goods that are intended to feed production centers, increase cost of insurance premiums due to the bad reputation of the port are some of the ways engendering losses and poor resource utilization in the transport and logistics function.

Thus, it calls for further studies to detail the problem and quantify the loss occasioning as a result of the prevailing situation. Giving specific suggestions about the state of the commercial security of goods in Tanzania ports, some experts rightly contended for the need of detailed study to unveil extent of the problem so action appropriate steps to tackle it can be established.

Notwithstanding the above, cargo security regulations are put in place at the firm and national level to encourage the use of principles in cargo security operations and facilitate uses of information and conduction of action orientated researchers to foster continuous development of cargo security in the logistic function.

The government, through pertinent organs like SUMATRA and others, should move to protect consumers of services of the port and other ports. In most cases, consumers have suffered more than the port as observed in the study. Furthermore, claim processes have always been more complicated than the majority, mostly SMEs, can pursue to win their legitimate compensation from TPA. This undermines the government's efforts to eradicate poverty among local SMEs. For a few firms that succeed to get compensated, the time they spend ad failure to meet delivery and / or productions schedules are things to reckon with.

Security standards need to be established so that ports will adopt appropriate cargo security system and engage sufficiently and ethical personal and value information in cargo security systems. This is based on the needs to save resources, support growth of SMEs in the logistics functions and market the port of Dar- es – Salaam to transit and cargo movers.

Under the current global situation with terrorism taking roots and threatening the economic and social prosperity of nations, cargo security should be evaluated in its wider perspectives. While focusing on commercial security of goods, proper plans to ensure commercial good have often served other security needs like preventing the movement of destructive weapons aimed at supporting war and terror crimes. Well- conceived national cargo security regulations that are made public and binding to every party in logistical functions are conducive in this respect.

A strategic disadvantage that the status of cargo security system puts Tanzania has to be surmounted. Since the port of Dar –es- Salaam serves other countries' international trade's remarkable impact on the level of Tanzania's exports of services that spontaneously accompany transportation of goods through the port. This cannot be ignored.

Also, a study by Chande (2005) revealed the stead percent increase of Tanzania cargo volume through Mombasa between years 1998-2003 from 5-7% pegging Tanzania as growing transit cargo client for Mombasa port. This implies growing importation of services into the country, services that the country should instead be exporting.

Chande (2005), reveals that Tanzania became the second important transit (client) country for Mombasa port by volume and trend beginning the year 2000, only behind Uganda. It's predicted by some expert that of the one of the reasons for the situation is the unacceptable degree of cargo insecurity at the port of Dar es Salaam. The application for the foregoing paragraph is that, inappropriate cargo security at the port may have perpetuated importation of transportation and related services from Kenya undeservedly unfavorable situation to the balance of payments of the nation.

Apparently there remain questions to be answered to qualify certain observation of this paper. Instead of relying on predictions, for instance, it needs further study to single out reasons for Tanzanians using Mombasa port more and more in recent years and ascertain the weight of commercial security of goods" as one of the reasons. The impact of in appropriate cargo security systems to performance and success of ports users, especially the easily vulnerable SMEs need also be more carefully investigated for it can have remarkable interpretations to the effectiveness of government efforts in poverty alleviation campaigns.

From the foregoing, it is impending for the customs, ports and business community to augment their concern about, and effort to establishing appropriate systems in implementing the SAFE framework and commercial security of goods in ports as soon as is practicable. At this rate, it appears to be of paramount importance to encourage researches in the area so as foster policy and plan related information and decisions.

4.0 CONCLUSION AND REMARKS

Generally speaking and as most experts observed, there is a urgency need to expedite implementation of SAFE frameworks in the country. Despite some challenges the country facing in implementation yet, it's one of useful tool in securing global trade. The calm situation in the region where no serious terrorist attack noted does not remove the possibility of its occurrence. The importance of securing global trade should be the focus of implementation efforts and it should not be overridden by revenue collection move. Commercial security of goods in Tanzania seems to be lacking as it being operated haphazardly. Functions of cargo security in ports have attracted negligible attention by top managers and administrators both individual firm and national levels leaving no purposeful efforts to make it contribute to the major objective of increasing value of firms. The result has not only been losses of, and damages to, goods in ports but also a manifestation of poor fund utilization of sponsors in cargo security systems.

Noting the significance of transport and logistical function to the economy of any country, transport community and the nation at large need to do large need to do something about the appalling commercial security of cargo in Tanzania ports by ensuring minimum requirements; presence of regulations and rules governing commercial security of goods, publicizing the rules and regulations, creating awareness of regulations to relevant publics, and ensuring skills and knowledge and practices by all personnel entrusted with responsibilities of commercial

security of goods. Since little is known about the situation of commercial security of goods in ports in Tanzania and in the supply chain system at large, researches on the subject matter should be encouraged. Appropriate cargo security systems- Theoretical Perspectives' & imminence of Researches in Tanzania Ports

ABBREVIATIONS

AEO	Authorized Economic Operator
CSI	Container Security Initiative
C-TPAT	Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorist
ICDs	Inland Container Depots
ISPS	International Ship and Port Security
OTS	Office of Transport Security
TAFFA	Tanzania Freight Forwarders' Association
TPA	Tanzania Ports Authority
WCO	World Customs Union

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